



An Audit Report on

**The Criminal Justice Information System  
at the Department of Public Safety and  
the Texas Department of Criminal  
Justice**

May 2016

Report No. 16-025



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## Overall Conclusion

The completeness and timeliness of some data in the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) **has improved since the previous State Auditor's Office's September 2011 audit of CJIS. However,** additional improvements are necessary to ensure the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of all criminal history records in CJIS.

CJIS consist of two independent systems managed by two separate state agencies. The Department of Public Safety (DPS) manages the Computerized Criminal History System, which is the system used to provide criminal background check services. The Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) manages the Corrections Tracking System, which it uses to manage information on offenders who are currently sentenced to prison, jail, parole, and probation. (See text box and Appendix 3 for more information about those systems.)

Since the 2011 audit, both DPS and TDCJ have made improvements in the completeness and timeliness of some data in CJIS. Specifically:

- As of January 2015, prosecutor offices and courts had submitted disposition records to the Computerized Criminal History System for 80.21 percent of arrests made in calendar year 2013<sup>1</sup>, an improvement from the 73.68 percent submission rate reported in 2011.
- In fiscal year 2015, 0.57 percent **of probation records in TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System** did not include the state identification number and 1.35 percent did not include the incident number. That is an improvement from the 3.09 percent of probation records that did not include the state identification number and 7.02 percent that did not include an incident

### Background Information

The Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) includes information systems at two state agencies:

- The Department of Public Safety (DPS) maintains the Computerized Criminal History System, which is the system DPS uses to provide criminal background check services. The system consists of criminal records in Texas that include:
  - ♦ Arrest records that law enforcement entities submit for arrested individuals.
  - ♦ Prosecutor records that district and county attorney's offices submit. Those records include information regarding offenses and charges that each attorney is pursuing for each defendant.
  - ♦ Records that county, district, and other courts submit. Those records include conviction decisions and sentencing information.
- The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) maintains the Corrections Tracking System, a collection of databases with records on offenders in state jail, in prison, on parole, and on probation.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 60, established CJIS and defines the type of information that it contains.

Sources: DPS, TDCJ, and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

<sup>1</sup> The submission rate calculation does not include the submission of juvenile arrest charges and dispositions. As of January 2015, the juvenile submission rate averaged 95.19 percent for arrests made in 2013.

number in 2011. (See text box for a definition of a state identification number and an incident number).

- In fiscal year 2015, 91.64 percent of arrest records were submitted within 7 days as required by statute, an improvement from the 84.25 percent submission rate reported in 2011.
- In fiscal year 2015, 74.14 percent of prosecutor records were submitted within 30 days as required by statute, an improvement from the 63.61 percent submission rate reported in 2011.
- As of November 2015, auditors observed that DPS staff were entering criminal records submitted within the last 24 hours and no longer had a backlog as reported in 2011.

State Identification and  
Incident Numbers

State identification number - A unique number assigned by DPS to each person whose name appears in CJIS.

Incident number - A unique number assigned to a specific person during a specific arrest.

Source: Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 60.

In addition, DPS has adequate controls in place to ensure that the Computerized Criminal History System data is sufficiently reliable. However, TDCJ should improve its controls to ensure that Corrections Tracking System data is complete and accurate.

### **DPS's Computerized Criminal History System**

The completeness and timeliness of the Computerized Criminal History System data has improved; however, the 80.21 completion rate indicates that users may not always receive complete criminal history background check results. Some cases take one or more years to proceed through the legal system; therefore, it may not be possible for all of the arrest charges to have a corresponding disposition within a year.

DPS should strengthen controls to ensure that only authorized users can access and modify records in the Computerized Criminal History System. In addition, DPS should perform a full backup and recovery test and verify that it can recover data from its local and remote virtual tape libraries to provide for the continued operation of the Computerized Criminal History System in the event of an emergency.

### **TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System**

TDCJ has improved the completeness of its probation records. However, 19.56 percent of records tested in the Corrections Tracking System for offenders admitted to jail, prison, or placed on parole during February 2015 did not contain incident numbers. Auditors also identified inaccuracies, such as incorrect state identification numbers, incident numbers, incident number suffixes, and offense codes.

**TDCJ implemented a process to monitor local probation departments' access** to arrest records associated with flash notices, which identify offenders on probation who have been arrested. However, that process is not sufficient to ensure that

local probation departments adequately monitor flash notices for probationers under their supervision. Specifically, local probation departments did not access flash notices for 50 (19.69 percent) of the 254 counties in Texas between March 2015 and October 2015.

TDCJ also should strengthen controls to ensure that only authorized users can access and modify records in the Corrections Tracking System and the system used **by TDCJ's Community Justice Assistance Division to monitor probationers.**

#### Implementation Status of Prior State Auditor's Office Recommendations

Auditors followed up on 20 of 22 recommendations in *An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System at the Department of Public Safety and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice* (State Auditor's Office Report No. 12-022, September 2011). Six recommendations were fully implemented, 13 recommendations were in various stages of implementation, and 1 recommendation was not implemented.

Table 1 presents a summary of the findings in this report and the related issue ratings. (See Appendix 2 for more information about the issue rating classifications and descriptions.)

Table 1

Summary of Chapters/Subchapters and Related Issue Ratings		
Chapter/ Subchapter	Title	Issue Rating <sup>a</sup>
1-A	DPS Has Implemented Sufficient Controls to Assist Reporting Entities in Submitting Complete Information to the Computerized Criminal History System; However, It Should Work with TDCJ to Identify Missing Information	Low
1-B	TDCJ Should Improve the Completeness of Criminal Records in Its Corrections Tracking System	Medium
2-A	DPS's Computerized Criminal History System Is Sufficiently Accurate	Low
2-B	TDCJ Should Improve the Accuracy of Data in Its Corrections Tracking System	Medium
3	The Distribution and Timeliness of Criminal History Data Has Improved	Medium
4-A	DPS Should Strengthen User Access, Change Management, and Backup Controls	Medium
4-B	TDCJ Should Strengthen User Access and Change Management Controls	Medium
5	Status of Prior Audit Recommendations	No Rating <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> A chapter/subchapter is rated Priority if the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could critically affect the **audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited.** Immediate action is required to address the noted concern and reduce risks to the audited entity.

A chapter/subchapter is rated High if the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could substantially affect the **audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited.** Prompt action is essential to address the noted concern and reduce risks to the audited entity.

A chapter/subchapter is rated Medium if the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could moderately affect the **audited entity's ability to effectively administer program(s)/function(s) audited.** Action is needed to address the noted concern and reduce risks to a more desirable level.

A chapter/subchapter is rated Low if the audit identified strengths that support the audited entity's ability to administer the program(s)/functions(s) audited or the issues identified do not present significant risks or effects that would negatively affect the **audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited.**

Summary of Chapters/Subchapters and Related Issue Ratings		
Chapter/ Subchapter	Title	Issue Rating <sup>a</sup>
<sup>b</sup> Auditors did not assign a rating to the issues presented in this chapter because those issues were addressed in previous chapters in this report.		

Auditors communicated other, less significant issues regarding policies and procedures and hardware support to DPS and TDCJ management separately in writing. In addition, to minimize the risks associated with public disclosure, auditors also communicated additional details about information technology findings separately to DPS and TDCJ management.

### ***Summary of Management’s Response***

At the end of each chapter in this report, auditors made recommendations to address the issues identified during this audit. DPS management agreed with the recommendations addressed to it in this report. TDCJ management concurred with the recommendations addressed to it in this report.

### ***Audit Objective and Scope***

The objective of this audit was to determine whether controls over CJIS help ensure that data in the system is complete, accurate, and up to date.

The scope of this audit covered data from CJIS. Specifically, data from DPS’s Computerized Criminal History System from September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015. The scope also covered data from TDCJ’s Corrections Tracking System for offenders placed in prison, in jail, and on parole during February 2015 and data from its Intermediate System<sup>2</sup> for offenders placed on probation from September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015.

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<sup>2</sup> As part of its Corrections Tracking System, TDCJ uses a component called the Intermediate System to track information on offenders serving probation. The Intermediate System allows local probation departments to upload probation records that do not have an offender state identification number and/or an incident number.

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# Detailed Results

## Chapter 1

### *DPS and TDCJ Have Improved the Completeness of CJIS Data; However, Some Records Are Still Incomplete*

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The Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) consist of two independent systems managed by two separate state agencies. The Department of Public Safety (DPS) manages the Computerized Criminal History System, which is the system used to provide criminal background check services. The Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) manages the Corrections Tracking System, which it uses to manage information on offenders who are currently sentenced to prison, jail, parole, and probation. (See Appendix 3 for more information about those systems.)

The completeness of the data in DPS's Computerized Criminal History System has improved. However, DPS and TDCJ should work together to identify missing information in CJIS. TDCJ also should improve the completeness of all data in its Corrections Tracking System.

#### Chapter 1-A

DPS Has Implemented Sufficient Controls to Assist Reporting Entities in Submitting Complete Information to the Computerized Criminal History System; However, It Should Work with TDCJ to Identify Missing Information

Chapter 1-A  
Rating:  
Low<sup>3</sup>

As of January 2015, prosecutor offices and courts had submitted disposition records to DPS's Computerized Criminal History System for 80.21 percent of arrest charges reported in calendar 2013. That is an improvement from the 73.68 percent submission rate the State Auditor's Office reported in its September 2011 audit report.<sup>4</sup> Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.05, requires that CJIS include information relating to each arrest charge and corresponding disposition for a felony or a misdemeanor not punishable by fine only. The percentage increase in submitted disposition records

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<sup>3</sup> The risk related to the issues discussed in Chapter 1-A is rated as Low because the audit identified strengths that support the audited entity's ability to administer the program(s)/functions(s) audited or the issues identified do not present significant risks or effects that would negatively affect the audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited.

<sup>4</sup> See *An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System at the Department of Public Safety and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice* (State Auditor's Office Report No. 12-002, September 2011).



#### Disposition Records

After police departments, sheriff's offices, and other law enforcement agencies submit arrest records to DPS's Computerized Criminal History System, prosecutor offices and courts are required to submit additional records to finalize each offense charge in the criminal record. Those records are referred to as "dispositions."

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.01, also defines "disposition" as an action that results in the termination, transfer to another jurisdiction, or indeterminate suspension of the prosecution of a criminal charge.

Sources: DPS and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

indicates that DPS controls over the criminal justice information reporting process generally function as intended (see text box for more information about disposition records).

One reason some arrest charges may not have a corresponding disposition recorded in the Computerized Criminal History System is that prosecutor offices and courts<sup>5</sup> do not always submit data in a timely manner (see Chapter 3 for additional details on the timeliness of data submissions). Another reason is that disposition records were submitted with errors that prevented matching a disposition record to an arrest record. Some cases take one or more years to proceed through the legal system; therefore, it may not be possible for all of the arrest charges to have a corresponding disposition within a year. (See Appendix 4 for a list of counties and the percent of dispositions that each county submitted to the Computerized Criminal History System for arrests reported in calendar year 2013.)

DPS monitors the collection and completeness of information in the Computerized Criminal History System by compiling an annual compliance report that details the number and percent of matching arrests and dispositions by county so that prosecutor offices and courts can review their performance. DPS makes that report available on its Web site, as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.21.

DPS also implemented controls, such as the creation of several other reports that allow reporting entities to monitor whether their data submissions were successful, determine the reason certain records were rejected so that corrections can be made, and track the number of offenses open for a specified period of time that still do not have a corresponding disposition. DPS has also implemented information technology controls to ensure certain information required by statute is submitted with each record (see Chapter 4 for additional details on information technology controls). It should be noted that DPS does not have administrative authority to penalize prosecutor offices and courts for not submitting the required information.

DPS should improve the completeness of the Computerized Criminal History System by working with TDCJ to identify missing information. **Auditors reviewed 20,521 records<sup>6</sup> for offenders in jail, in prison, or on probation who were convicted**

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<sup>5</sup> In fiscal year 2015, approximately 4,250 law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and court entities reported information to the Computerized Criminal History System.

<sup>6</sup> Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.051, requires DPS to track each offense. Because an offender can be charged with more than one offense related to an arrest, the number of records referenced in this report represents the number of offenses, not the number of offenders.

of crimes and began serving sentences in February 2015 according to TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System, and compared those records to arrest and court records in DPS's Computerized Criminal History System. Auditors were able to reconcile 14,782 (72.03 percent) records to a court record and 287 (1.40 percent) records to an arrest record. However, auditors could not perform a full reconciliation of the remaining 5,452 (26.57 percent) records because either the arrest and court records were not available in the DPS's Computerized Criminal History System or because the records in TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System were not sufficiently complete and accurate to make a positive match (see Chapter 1-B for details on data completeness and Chapter 2-B for details on data accuracy).

In 2011, the State Auditor's Office recommended that DPS work with TDCJ to implement a process that would assist those agencies in identifying information missing from CJIS. While DPS and TDCJ discussed a process that would allow them to identify missing records, that process had not been finalized as of September 30, 2015. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.02(i), requires DPS and TDCJ to develop and maintain monitoring systems capable of identifying missing information. Incomplete information for some individuals in DPS's Computerized Criminal History System increases the risk that potential employers, criminal justice agencies, or authorized individuals who may query individuals' criminal histories would not be able to determine whether an arrest resulted in a conviction without contacting the appropriate prosecutor's office or court clerk to request hard copies of prosecutor and court records.

#### Recommendation

DPS should work with TDCJ and implement a process to identify arrest and court disposition records that are missing from the Computerized Criminal History System. In addition, upon identifying missing records, DPS should request information from the corresponding law enforcement agency or court to improve the completeness of the data in the Computerized Criminal History System.

#### Management's Response

*DPS agrees with the recommendation and will work with TDCJ to identify opportunities to reconcile missing records. It would be beneficial if TDCJ would make it mandatory for agencies to report the TRN's for inclusion in the CTS. This would give DPS more information to determine what is missing.*

*Title of Responsible Person: CRS Deputy Administrator, Law Enforcement Services Division*

*Implementation Date: April 2016*

Chapter 1-B

TDCJ Should Improve the Completeness of Criminal Records in Its Corrections Tracking System

Chapter 1-B  
Rating:  
Medium <sup>7</sup>

TDCJ uses the Corrections Tracking System to manage criminal information for offenders sentenced to prison, jail, parole, and probation. However, the databases used to manage prison, jail, and parole records do not require records to include an incident number. Because that information field is not mandatory, records can be created with that required information missing. The state identification number and the incident number are unique identifiers that should be present on each criminal record, as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.052. Those numbers are used throughout the judicial process to track a specific offense.

Auditors reviewed records for offenders sentenced to jail, prison, and placed on parole during February 2015. That analysis showed that 19.56 percent of jail, prison, and parole records did not include incident numbers as of October 2015. Specifically:

- Of 2,052 jail records, 883 (43.03 percent) did not include incident numbers.
- Of 4,095 prison records, 478 (11.67 percent) did not include incident numbers.
- Of 2,800 parole records, 389 (13.89 percent) did not include incident numbers.

TDCJ policy requires its employees to document the incident number in its Corrections Tracking System if that information is provided in court documents. However, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.052, requires TDCJ to document the incident number in its Corrections Tracking System for all records to ensure data completeness. While the courts may not always provide complete information, TDCJ employees have access to

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<sup>7</sup> The risk related to the issues discussed in Chapter 1-B is rated as Medium because the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could moderately affect the audited entity's ability to effectively administer program(s)/function(s) audited. Action is needed to address the noted concerns and reduce risks to a more desirable level.

DPS's Computerized Criminal History System and could obtain the missing information to ensure that offender records in the Corrections Tracking System are complete, as required by statute.

In addition, as part of its Corrections Tracking System, TDCJ uses a component called the Intermediate System to track information on offenders serving probation. The Intermediate System allows local probation departments to upload offender records even if those records do not include the offender state identification number and the incident number.

Auditors reviewed 177,400 records<sup>8</sup> from the Intermediate System for offenders placed on probation during fiscal year 2015 and determined that:

- A total of 1,005 (0.57 percent) probation records did not have a state identification number.
- A total of 2,393 (1.35 percent) probation records did not have an incident number.

That is an improvement since the 2011 State Auditor's Office audit of CJIS, which determined that 3.09 percent of the probation records tested did not have state identification numbers and 7.02 percent of the probation records tested did not have incident numbers. (See Appendix 6 for a list of local probation department with highest number of records without state identification numbers).

After the 2011 State Auditor's Office audit of CJIS, TDCJ issued a policy in February 2012 regarding the requirements for local probation departments to obtain and submit information to the Corrections Tracking System. However, that policy does not include clear expectations as required by Texas Government Code, Section 509.012. TDCJ's policy states that it will monitor and notify local probation departments that exceed the statewide average error rate. However, the policy does not specify a maximum tolerance for the statewide average error rate. Establishing a maximum tolerance is important because, if the majority of local probation departments do not submit complete information, the statewide average error rate can be high.

As discussed in Chapter 1-A, the completeness of data in CJIS could be improved if TDCJ works with DPS to identify missing information in their respective systems. Of the 20,521 records that auditors reviewed for offenders in jail, in prison, and on probation who began serving sentences in

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<sup>8</sup> Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.052, requires TDCJ to track each offense. Because an offender can be charged with more than one offense related to an arrest, the number of records referenced in this report represents the number of offenses, not the number of offenders.

February 2015, 5,452 (26.57 percent) records were not reconciled either because the arrest and court records were not available in DPS's Computerized Criminal History System or because the records in TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System were not sufficiently complete and accurate. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.02 (f), states that information that TDCJ receives that DPS requires for the preparation of a criminal history record shall be made available no later than 7 days after DPS requests the information.

## Recommendations

### TDCJ should:

- Consider programming its Corrections Tracking System to make the incident number a mandatory information field when a user creates a new offender record.
- Clearly define compliance expectations so that local probation departments can be held accountable for not providing complete information.
- Search the Computerized Criminal History System for missing information to ensure that the Corrections Tracking System data is complete. TDCJ should notify DPS when the Computerized Criminal History System does not have information that should be available.
- Work with DPS to implement a process to identify information missing from CJIS. In addition, upon a request for information from DPS, TDCJ should provide that information within 7 days, as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 60.

## Management's Response

*Concur. TDCJ will consult with state policy makers and county officials, and subsequent to those discussions will determine whether to make the incident number a mandatory field when creating a new offender record. If the field becomes mandatory, TDCJ would require receipt of the incident number in order to admit the offender into TDCJ. Target Date: December 31, 2016.*

*Concur. TDCJ-Community Justice Assistance Division (CJAD) will revise the policy statement issued in February 2012 to more clearly define compliance expectations to include statewide error rate tolerance for missing State Identification numbers and missing Tracking Incident numbers. Target Date: May 31, 2016.*

*Concur. Assuming the incident number becomes a mandatory field. With receipt of the incident number, searching for missing information would remain an option for unusual circumstances, but generally should not be necessary. Absent receipt of the incident number, searching the Computerized Criminal History system would have a significant impact on the timely processing of incoming offenders. Target Date: December 31, 2016.*

*Concur. TDCJ-Information Technology Division (ITD) will work with DPS to implement a process to identify missing information in CJIS. Once that process is in place, the TDCJ will respond to DPS requests for information within seven days as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 60. Target Date: April 30, 2016*

## The Accuracy of Selected Criminal History Information System Data Needs Improvement

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Auditors visited six law enforcements agencies in Bell County and Hidalgo County and determined that, in general, those agencies submitted accurate information to DPS's Computerized Criminal History System. Auditors identified discrepancies between original documentation and data in the Computerized Criminal History System; however, those errors would not have a significant effect on the accuracy of criminal background check results. In addition, weaknesses in TDCJ data entry process increase the risk of inaccuracies in the Corrections Tracking System.

### Chapter 2-A

#### DPS's Computerized Criminal History System Is Sufficiently Accurate

Chapter 2-A  
Rating:  
Low <sup>9</sup>

Auditors visited six law enforcement agencies to review the accuracy of criminal records that those agencies submitted to DPS's Computerized Criminal History System. Auditors identified some inaccurate records; however, those errors would not significantly affect the results of criminal history background checks. (See Appendix 5 for a list of all law enforcement agencies that auditors visited.)

Auditors tested the accuracy of the information submitted for selected information fields in the Computerized Criminal History System that, based on auditors' judgement, were significant for ensuring that the Computerized Criminal History System (1) can make an accurate match between an arrest record and its corresponding disposition record, (2) includes sufficient demographic information to identify an offender, and (3) provides sufficient information if a criminal background check is performed on an offender.

The data tested in the Computerized Criminal History System was sufficiently accurate at the six law enforcement agencies that auditors visited. The most significant error identified was 1 (1.69 percent) of 59 records tested at the Killeen Police Department for which the arrest charge was documented as a felony 3 instead of the correct felony 2, which is a higher offense degree. Auditors did not identify any discrepancies at Bell County Court at Law No. 2 or at the McAllen Police Department. While auditors did not identify any significant errors, all six law enforcement agencies that auditors visited reported that they did not have a process for reviewing data entered into the

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<sup>9</sup> The risk related to the issues discussed in Chapter 2-A is rated as Low because the audit identified strengths that support the audited entity's ability to administer the program(s)/functions(s) audited or the issues identified do not present significant risks or effects that would negatively affect the audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited.

Computerized Criminal History System for accuracy, which increases the risk of inaccurate data being entered in the future.

Chapter 2-B

### TDCJ Should Improve the Accuracy of Data in Its Corrections Tracking System

Chapter 2-B  
Rating:  
Medium <sup>10</sup>

For offenders who are sentenced to prison, TDCJ creates an offender record based on documents provided by the courts in the State Ready System, which is a component of TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System. When an offender makes parole, TDCJ uses information from the State Ready System and from the certificate of parole to create a parolee record. TDCJ manages parolee records using the Offender Information Management System, which is a component of the Corrections Tracking System. (See Appendix 3 for more information about those systems.)

Auditors tested the accuracy of 33 parolee records by comparing electronic data to court documents and parole certificates and did not identify any discrepancies in 7 of 8 information fields tested. However, as discussed in Chapter 1-A, the completeness of data in CJIS could be improved if TDCJ worked with DPS to identify missing information. Auditors selected 25 of the 5,452 records that could not be matched between DPS's Computerized Criminal History System and TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System to determine why these records could not be matched. Auditors' analysis indicated that all 25 records in the Corrections Tracking System had errors that prevented a match, such as incorrect state identification numbers, offense codes, incident numbers, and incident number suffixes. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.02, requires CJIS to supply the State with a system that provides accurate information that can be used (1) for operational decision making; (2) to conduct impact analyses of proposed legislative changes in the criminal justice system; and (3) to improve the ability of interested parties to analyze the functioning of the criminal justice system.

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<sup>10</sup> The risk related to the issues discussed in Chapter 2-B is rated as Medium because the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could moderately affect the audited entity's ability to effectively administer program(s)/function(s) audited. Action is needed to address the noted concerns and reduce risks to a more desirable level.



TDCJ employees responsible for documenting the incident number suffix in the Corrections Tracking System do not accurately document that information to ensure that each offense is tracked separately, as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.052 (see text box for more information about the incident number

#### Incident Number Suffix

The incident number suffix, also known as a “tracking number suffix,” is assigned by the arresting agency or prosecutor and is added to the incident number to identify each offense and count arising from a single arrest.

The incident number suffix is an addendum to the incident number. Those numbers together are necessary to track specific charges related to an incident involving one person.

Source: *TDCJ Community Supervision Tracking System Application Manual.*

suffix). Because an offender may be charged with multiple offenses during an arrest, including the same type of offense more than one time, it is imperative that each charge includes the incident number suffix that the arresting agency or prosecutor assigned to correctly determine the number of charges. For example, auditors reviewed the records for an offender who was charged with 32 offenses during the same arrest. Eleven of the 32 charges were for the same type of offense. Because TDCJ used the same incident number suffix for those 11 charges, only 1 of the 11 records could be matched with a record in DPS’s Computerized Criminal History System.

Without accurate records, there is an increased risk of an inaccurate reflection of an offender’s charges. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.052, requires TDCJ to track the sentence length for each offense and, if multiple sentences were ordered, whether those sentences were ordered to be served consecutively or concurrently. In addition, not accurately documenting the incident number suffix may prevent users of Corrections Tracking System data from being able to determine whether a record was entered twice in error or whether an offender was charged multiple times with the same type of offense.

#### Recommendation

TDCJ should establish a data quality process to ensure that all data, including incident number suffixes, is accurately captured in the Corrections Tracking System.

#### Management’s Response

*Concur. TDCJ will establish an enhanced data quality process to help ensure data is accurately entered in the Corrections Tracking System as offenders are received into TDCJ. Target Date: August 31, 2016.*

## The Distribution and Timeliness of Criminal History Data Has Improved

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Chapter 3  
Rating:  
Medium <sup>11</sup>

### Criminal Justice Agencies Reporting Requirements

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.08(d), specifies that “Except as otherwise required by applicable state laws or regulations, information or data required by this chapter to be reported to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice or the Department of Public Safety shall be reported promptly but not later than the 30th day after the date on which the information or data is received by the agency responsible for reporting it except in the case of an arrest. An offender’s arrest shall be reported to the Department of Public Safety not later than the seventh day after the date of the arrest.”

Since 2011, the timeliness of some data in CJIS has improved. In the 2011 audit of CJIS, the State Auditor’s Office reported that DPS had not entered into the Computerized Criminal History System records that reporting agencies had submitted in hard-copy form during a time period that covered approximately two months. On November 2015, auditors observed that DPS staff were entering criminal records submitted within the last 24 hours and no longer had a backlog as of that date.

However, DPS should continue monitoring the timely submission of certain disposition records and notify the appropriate commissioner court when the county reporting agencies do not comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.08(d), (see text box for additional details about the reporting requirements).

DPS has established adequate controls to assist reporting entities in monitoring the timeliness of data submission, but improvements are still necessary. As discussed in Chapter 1-A, DPS has created several reports to assist reporting agencies in monitoring the success of information submissions to the Computerized Criminal History System and compliance with reporting requirements. Auditors analyzed the arrest and disposition records submitted to DPS’s Computerized Criminal History System during fiscal year 2015 and determined that general compliance with timeliness requirements has improved since the State Auditor’s Office audit report in September 2011. Specifically:

- Of arrest records, 91.64 percent were submitted within 7 days as required by statute. That is an improvement from the 84.25 percent reported in September 2011.
- Of records that prosecutors rejected, 74.14 percent were submitted within 30 days as required by statute. That is an improvement from the 63.61 percent reported in September 2011.
- Of court records, 68.58 percent were submitted within 30 days as required by statute. That is a decrease from the 76.48 percent reported in September 2011.

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<sup>11</sup> The risk related to the issues discussed in Chapter 3 is rated as Medium because the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could moderately affect the audited entity’s ability to effectively administer program(s)/function(s) audited. Action is needed to address the noted concerns and reduce risks to a more desirable level.

### Flash Notices

TDCJ provides information to DPS about which individuals with criminal records in the Corrections Tracking System are on probation or parole. Information for those individuals is **flagged in DPS's Computerized Criminal History System** so that, if those individuals are arrested again, their probation or parole officers will be notified of the arrest. Those **notifications are called "flash notices."**

Source: TDCJ.

### Community Justice Assistance Division

The Community Justice Assistance Division administers community supervision, or adult probation, in Texas. It does not work directly with offenders. Instead, it works with local probation departments (called community supervision and corrections departments), which supervise offenders placed on probation.

There are 122 local probation departments organized within judicial districts that serve the 254 counties in Texas.

Source: TDCJ.

In 2011, the State Auditor's Office recommended that DPS monitor data submissions and notify the appropriate commissioner court when the county reporting agencies did not comply with statutory requirements. DPS reports that it generates a disposition timeliness report on a continuous basis that shows the number of transactions per county that exceed the 30-day statutory requirement; however, that report is not provided to the appropriate commissioner court as recommended in 2011.

While the viewing of flash notices and corresponding arrest records by local probation departments has improved, TDCJ policy should set clear expectations to help ensure that flash notices are viewed on a timely basis for all 254 counties (see text box for information about flash notices).

**The Community Justice Assistance Division within TDCJ established a process to monitor local probation departments' viewing of flash notices (see text box for detail on that division's functions). However, that process is not sufficient to ensure that local probation departments adequately monitor flash notices for probationers under their supervision.**

According to TDCJ policy, each local probation department must designate a flash notice coordinator who is responsible for distributing flash notices to the probation officers within each county that the local probation department serves. Auditors analyzed local probation departments' flash notice activity from March 18, 2015, through October 19, 2015, and determined the following:

- Local probation departments had not viewed flash notices for 50 (19.69 percent) of the 254 counties in Texas.
- Four of the 50 counties that had not viewed flash notices did not have an account to access flash notices.
- Six (2.94 percent) of the 204 counties that were active at some point during the time period reviewed had their flash notice user access revoked as of October 19, 2015.

While that is an improvement from the 120 (47.24 percent) counties the State Auditor's Office reported in its September 2011 audit report as not viewing arrest records associated with flash notices, not receiving all flash notices in a timely manner prevents local probation officers from properly responding and taking required action when an offender is arrested while sentenced to probation. (See Appendix 7 for a list of counties that did not view arrest records associated with flash notices.)

To address a State Auditor's Office recommendation in the 2011 audit report, TDCJ issued a policy in February 2012 that requires all local probation department directors to designate a flash notice coordinator. However, that policy is not sufficient to ensure that local probation departments view flash notices in a timely manner because the policy does not include expectations, such as how often flash notices should be viewed, and it does not include any penalties if local probation departments do not comply with the policy. In addition, TDCJ allows only one flash notice coordinator to be assigned an access account at each local probation department. When a flash notice coordinator is not available, that significantly affects a local probation department's ability to view flash notices in a timely manner.

TDCJ's information technology department reports that it would need to conduct additional analysis to determine whether the flash notice module can be programmed to accommodate granting access to more than one flash notice coordinator per local probation department. Furthermore, while the Community Justice Assistance Department monitors local probation departments' viewing of flash notices, it reported that it does not perform any follow up to verify that those local probation departments viewed outstanding flash notices.

#### Recommendations

DPS should, as part of its monitoring process, notify the appropriate commissioner court when a reporting agency does not comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 60.

TDCJ should:

- Clearly define in its policy how often local probation departments should access and view flash notices and clearly define penalties for not meeting those requirements.
- Ensure that all local probation departments have an access account to view flash notices.
- As part of its monitoring process, follow up on local probation departments that do not view flash notices in accordance with policy.

- Determine whether the flash notice module can be programmed to grant access to more than one flash notice coordinator per local probation department and grant additional access as necessary to ensure the timely viewing and distribution of flash notices.

#### **Management's Response from DPS**

*DPS agrees with the recommendation and will continue to monitor the timeliness of submissions and notify the appropriate commissioner's court when a reporting agency does not comply with Chapter 60, CCP.*

*Title of Responsible Person: CRS Deputy Administrator, Law Enforcement Services Division*

*Implementation Date: April 2016*

#### **Management's Response from TDCJ**

*Concur. TDCJ-CJAD will revise the policy statement issued in February 2012 to include how often local probation departments should access and view flash notices; the policy statement will include clearly defined penalties for not meeting the requirements. Target Date: May 31, 2016*

*Concur. TDCJ-CJAD will ensure that all local probation departments have a flash notice coordinator with an active account to access and view flash notices. Target Date: June 15, 2016*

*Concur. TDCJ-CJAD will continue to monitor local probation department flash notice activity and regularly notify and follow-up with departments that fail to timely view flash notices according to policy. Target Date: May 31, 2016*

*Concur. TDCJ will determine if the flash notice module can be programmed to grant access to more than one flash notice coordinator per local probation department, to ensure timely viewing and distribution of flash notices. Target Date: July 29, 2016*

## Selected Information Technology Controls Should Be Improved at Both Agencies

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DPS and TDCJ should strengthen certain information technology controls in the Computerized Criminal History System and the Corrections Tracking System to ensure that CJIS records in those systems are protected from unauthorized changes and inappropriate access and that information is available to users.

Chapter 4-A

DPS Should Strengthen User Access, Change Management, and Backup Controls

Chapter 4-A  
Rating:  
Medium <sup>12</sup>

DPS should ensure that it grants appropriate levels of access to programmers. **Auditors identified a total of 19 user accounts that granted DPS programmers inappropriate administrative access to the servers, application, and production databases for the Computerized Criminal History System. That inappropriate access increased the risk of unauthorized changes and/or the ability to add, remove, modify other user access rights, modify the system security configurations, or modify or delete criminal records from the system. Furthermore, auditors identified an additional six accounts that allowed the user to test changes in the production environment. Five of those six user accounts were generic accounts that cannot be traced to a specific user, decreasing accountability.**

After auditors brought these issues to its attention, DPS reported that it rescinded user access for seven programmer accounts to the server that supports a Web portal used to add, modify, and delete criminal records. However, four of those seven accounts still had inappropriate access to other components of the Computerized Criminal History System. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which sets the information technology requirements for CJIS, requires agencies to enforce the most restrictive set of access rights needed by users for the performance of specified tasks. Auditors identified similar weaknesses in DPS's user access controls in the 2011 audit of CJIS.

Auditors did not detect any instances of fraud or unauthorized changes to criminal data, and DPS has an automated log to track changes made to criminal data. However, the weaknesses in user access controls increase the risk of unauthorized changes and do not allow for adequate segregation of

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<sup>12</sup> The risk related to the issues discussed in Chapter 4-A is rated as Medium because the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could moderately affect the audited entity's ability to effectively administer program(s)/function(s) audited. Action is needed to address the noted concern and reduce risks to a more desirable level.

duties between those responsible for making changes to the Computerized Criminal History System and those responsible for promoting changes to the production environment.

DPS should restrict access based on user job needs and disable idle accounts in a timely manner. As of October 5, 2015, DPS had authorized 5,045 accounts for employees of prosecutor's offices and courts that granted access for records to be added to and modified in the Computerized Criminal History System. DPS's policy requires any account that has not been active for 90 days or has not been accessed within 30 days of creation to be disabled. However, DPS does not conduct regular reviews to comply with that policy. Instead, DPS requires prosecutor and courts users to notify it when an account needs to be removed.

That process did not ensure that DPS's policy was followed. Specifically, as of October 5, 2015, of the 5,045 active accounts, (1) 2,312 (45.83 percent) accounts had not been signed into within the last 90 days, and (2) 344 (6.82 percent) accounts had never been accessed since the accounts were created. Some of those accounts were created as far back as July 2009. In addition, 128 (2.54 percent) accounts were generic accounts not assigned to a specific individual. DPS policy requires all accounts to be assigned to a unique individual to ensure individual user accountability.

Auditors also identified one active DPS employee with administrative access to the server that supports the Web portal used by prosecutors and courts to report criminal information who no longer required that access to perform assigned job duties. DPS provided documentation showing that it had initiated the process to remove that employee's access in June 2015; however, that deactivation had not been completed as of December 2015.

DPS should ensure adequate segregation of duties in its change management process. All seven changes that auditors tested for changes programmers made to the Computerized Criminal History System in fiscal year 2015 were properly approved, including two changes that were categorized as emergency changes. DPS also performed a post-implementation review to verify that there were no unexpected effects on the system due to the two emergency changes. However, a lack of segregation of duties among staff involved in the change management process increases the risk of unauthorized changes to the Computerized Criminal History System. Specifically:

- Five (71.43 percent) of the 7 changes were released into production by the same programmer who created the change.

- For 1 (16.67 percent) of 6 changes that required testing, DPS could not provide sufficient documentation to show that the change was tested prior to releasing it into production.

DPS should test and document its backup and recovery operations for the Computerized Criminal History System. **DPS had an adequate process to recover data from its local virtual tape library backup; however, as of December 2015, DPS reported that it had not performed and documented a full recovery test. DPS policy requires it to document, review, and test its backup process periodically. Furthermore, DPS did not have a documented process to recover data from its remote location. DPS policy requires it to review its offsite backup storage procedures annually.**

Having a documented process and conducting periodic testing helps increase the likelihood that DPS can recover its data and quickly restore services in the event of a disaster that affected the primary system. Otherwise, users may not be able to report or obtain criminal history information until the system could be brought back online.

DPS implemented adequate controls on certain information fields. **Auditors tested controls on selected key information fields and determined that DPS had implemented sufficient controls to ensure that prosecutor and courts entities submit certain information required by statute with each disposition record.**

#### Recommendations

##### DPS should:

- Limit user access based on job responsibilities and remove user access in a timely manner when users' job responsibilities change or access is no longer required.
- Perform a user access review of the Web portal that grants access to prosecutor offices and courts, and remove the accounts that do not meet DPS policy requirements.
- Ensure that all user accounts are assigned to specific individuals.
- Segregate the duties of preparing and deploying all changes to the Computerized Criminal History System.
- Perform a full backup and recovery test from its local virtual tape library and document the results of that test.



- Develop written procedures to recover data from its remote location, test those procedures, and document the results of that testing.

### **Management's Response**

*DPS agrees with the recommendations and has already or will do the following:*

- *Add process to include periodic checks validating continued need for access.*
- *Implemented an automated process that checks for access that meets DPS policy requirements. Users that don't access the system within 30 days are dropped.*
- *Add process to include periodic checks validating accounts are assigned to specific individuals.*
- *Efficient use of staff may not allow for segregation of duties. Use best practices of change control to ensure only authorized and approved changes are introduced to the system.*
- *Conduct periodic tests to ensure back-ups can be accomplished successfully from the Virtual Tape system using documented procedures.*

*Title of Responsible Person: Deputy Assistant Director, Infrastructure & Operations, Information Technology Division*

*Implementation Date: All items by 9/1/2016*

## TDCJ Should Strengthen User Access and Change Management Controls

Chapter 4-B  
Rating:  
Medium <sup>13</sup>

TDCJ has made some improvements regarding segregation of duties; however, other improvements are still necessary. **TDCJ has improved the security of criminal records since the 2011 audit by limiting programmers' ability to make modifications to its Corrections Tracking System.** Specifically, TDCJ has limited access in its information technology division to four programmers who have read-only access. That is an improvement from the 11 programmers with access authority to update data and the database identified in the 2011 State Auditor's Office audit of CJIS. However, the four programmers responsible for managing the Community Justice Assistance Division's Intermediate System and support components have administrative access to that system. That access allows those four programmers to make changes not only to production data, but it also allows them to add, modify, and remove user accounts and users' passwords in the system. That increases the risk of unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the system.

TDCJ should update its policies and procedures to protect its information resources from unauthorized changes. **All of the information technology systems that support the Corrections Tracking System are housed at the State Data Center.** While TDCJ has written information technology policies and procedures, they do not delineate responsibilities between TDCJ employees and the State Data Center staff for changes to be made to the Corrections Tracking System. The 2011 audit also identified that weakness and recommended that TDCJ update its policies and procedures to help ensure that all changes are properly controlled and authorized. However, as of March 2016, TDCJ had not updated its policies and procedures.

In addition, TDCJ's Community Justice Assistance Division has its own information technology policies and procedures that address specific areas applicable to the Intermediate System. Those policies and procedures do not clearly define the segregation of duties requirements between those responsible for making programming changes in the Intermediate System and those responsible for promoting those changes into production. In addition, there was no evidence of management approval of those policies and procedures, which were dated June 3, 2015, as required by TDCJ's Information Resource Security Program policy.

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<sup>13</sup> The risk related to the issues discussed in Chapter 4-B is rated as Medium because the issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could moderately affect the audited entity's ability to effectively administer program(s)/function(s) audited. Action is needed to address the noted concern and reduce risks to a more desirable level.

TDCJ should conduct periodic reviews of user access to the Intermediate System. TDCJ does not perform periodic user access reviews to ensure that local probation department users still need access to the Intermediate System to perform their duties because it cannot readily determine to which local probation department a user account belongs. While TDCJ captures the user's full name when it creates an account, the system does not have an information field to capture the name of the user's local probation department. TDCJ reports that it cannot make programming changes to add an information field to capture the local probation department's name.

Furthermore, when access to the Intermediate System is requested, users must complete several forms that identify the requestor's full name and local probation department. However, TDCJ does not capture that information in a database that would facilitate generating a report that identifies the user name and the local probation department, which would enable TDCJ to perform a user access review.

As of December 2015, TDCJ reported that there were approximately 949 accounts with access to the Intermediate System. However, due to constraints discussed above, TDCJ relies on local probation departments to notify it when an account is no longer necessary. TDCJ's Information Resource Security Program policy requires system administrators or designated staff to remove the accounts of individuals who changed roles or no longer need access to TDCJ's systems. It also requires TDCJ to have a documented process for periodically reviewing existing accounts for validity.

TDCJ should improve its monitoring of the Corrections Tracking System. TDCJ has activated certain audit trails to improve the security of the Corrections Tracking System. As recommended by the State Auditor's Office in 2011, TDCJ has programmed certain triggers to facilitate data processing and implement audit trails to protect key database files that store criminal information in its Corrections Tracking System. However, TDCJ has not designated a person or position to monitor mission-critical information audit trails on a regular basis. The FBI's CJIS policy requires TDCJ to designate an individual or position to review information system audit records, and that review should be conducted at a minimum of once per week.

## Recommendations

### TDCJ should:

- Ensure that all of its information technology policies are up to date, clearly address change management roles and responsibilities, clearly define segregation of duties, and are approved by management.
- Limit user access based on job responsibilities.
- Develop a process to capture user access information for accounts that grant access to its Intermediate System, including the local probation department to which each user account belongs. In addition, it should perform periodic user access reviews and remove unnecessary accounts in a timely manner when users' job responsibilities change or access is no longer required.
- Designate a person or position to monitor mission-critical information audit trails on a regular basis to enhance the security of its system and conduct regular reviews as required.

### Management's Response

*Concur. TDCJ will update its information technology policies to address change management roles and responsibilities to ensure that segregation of duties is defined. All updated policies will be approved by management. Target Date: June 15, 2016*

*Concur. TDCJ-CJAD will determine user access limits for making programming changes to the Intermediate System and limit user access according to job responsibilities. Target Date: May 31, 2016*

*Concur. TDCJ-CJAD will develop a database to capture the user account information for Intermediate System accounts to include local probation department information. User accounts will be periodically reviewed and disabled as necessary when user access is no longer required. Target Date: May 15, 2016*

*Concur. TDCJ will designate a person or position to monitor mission-critical information audit trails on a regular basis to enhance the security of its systems as required. Target Date: May 1, 2016*

Auditors followed up on 20 of 22 recommendations in *An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System at the Department of Public Safety and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice* (State Auditor's Office Report No. 12-002, September 2011). Auditors did not assign a rating to the issues presented in this chapter because most of those issues were discussed in previous chapters in this report. Table 2 on the next page contains additional information about the implementation status of prior audit recommendations (see text box for definitions of each implementation status).

Of the 20 recommendations reviewed, auditors determined that:

- Of 12 recommendations directed to DPS:
  - ♦ Four recommendations were fully implemented.
  - ♦ One recommendation was substantially implemented.
  - ♦ The implementation of seven recommendations was incomplete/ongoing.
- Of eight recommendations directed to TDCJ:
  - ♦ Two recommendations were fully implemented.
  - ♦ Two recommendations were substantially implemented.
  - ♦ The implementation of three recommendations was incomplete/ongoing.
  - ♦ One recommendation was not implemented.

Implementation Status Definitions

Fully Implemented - Successful development and use of a process, system, or policy to implement a prior recommendation.

Substantially Implemented - Successful development but inconsistent use of a process, system, or policy to implement a prior recommendation.

Incomplete/Ongoing - Ongoing development of a process, system, or policy to address a prior recommendation.

Not Implemented - Lack of a formal process, system, or policy to address a prior recommendation.

Table 2

Status of Implementation of Prior Audit Recommendations from An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System at the Department of Public Safety and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice				
No.	Recommendation	Implementation Status as Reported by the Agency	Implementation Status as Determined by Auditors	Auditor Comments
Department of Public Safety				
1	DPS should consider working with TDCJ to reconcile court records in the Computerized Criminal History System to locate and identify <b>missing offender records in TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System</b> .	Fully Implemented as of December 27, 2012	Incomplete/ Ongoing	While DPS and TDCJ discussed a process that would allow them to identify missing records, that process had not been finalized as of September 30, 2015.
2	DPS should <b>collect data for offenders in TDCJ's</b> probation programs in the Computerized Criminal History System, and include that data in the results of criminal history background checks.	Fully Implemented as of December 27, 2012	Incomplete/ Ongoing	DPS added a notice on background checks results that additional information may be available from the Corrections Tracking System. However, the recipient of that information may not know what additional information is available or how to obtain that additional information. DPS does not receive custody information from TDCJ as recommended in 2011.
3	DPS should monitor the submission of information to the Computerized Criminal History System to help ensure that it receives that information within the time frames required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.08.	Fully Implemented as of December 27, 2012	Fully Implemented	
4	DPS should submit arrest and disposition monitoring reports to the appropriate commissioner court when a criminal justice agency does not comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 60.	Fully Implemented as of December 27, 2012	Incomplete/ Ongoing	While DPS generates a report on a continuous basis to monitor the timeliness of the submission of disposition records, it does not provide that report to the appropriate commissioner court as recommend.
5	DPS should enter information into the Computerized Criminal History System in a timely manner.	Fully Implemented as of December 27, 2012	Fully Implemented	
6	DPS should continue to provide training to law enforcement agencies on arrest record requirements, <b>including DPS's processes for</b> submitting accurate information for out-of-county arrests.	Fully Implemented as of December 27, 2012	Fully Implemented	
7	DPS should periodically review criminal records in the Computerized Criminal History System for common data entry errors, and follow up with criminal justice agencies that submitted erroneous records.	Fully Implemented as of December 27, 2012	Fully Implemented	

Status of Implementation of Prior Audit Recommendations from  
*An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System at the Department of Public Safety and  
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice*

No.	Recommendation	Implementation Status as Reported by the Agency	Implementation Status as Determined by Auditors	Auditor Comments
8	<p>DPS should comply with all applicable sections of Title 1 of the Texas Administrative Code when administering the Computerized Criminal History System, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reviewing the access of all users with special access to the Computerized Criminal History System, and revoking all access that is not necessary for users to complete their job responsibilities.</li> </ul>	Fully Implemented as of January 6, 2015	Incomplete/Ongoing	Auditors identified 19 user accounts that granted programmers inappropriate access.
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing and implementing a process to deactivate or revise user access to the Computerized Criminal History System in a <b>timely manner when users' job responsibilities change.</b></li> </ul>	Fully Implemented as of January 6, 2015	Substantially implemented	DPS implemented a process to deactivate or revise user access to the Computerized Criminal History System; however, that process does not adequately ensure that account deactivations and modifications are completed in a timely manner. DPS also relies on prosecutor offices and courts to notify it when an account is no longer required.
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Segregating the duties of developing and installing all changes to the Computerized Criminal History System, operating systems, and databases.</li> </ul>	Fully Implemented as of January 6, 2015	Incomplete/Ongoing	Five of seven changes that auditors tested were released into production by the same programmer who created the change.
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing policies and procedures for monitoring attempts to access the Computerized Criminal History System and related resources.</li> </ul>	Fully Implemented as of January 6, 2015	Incomplete/Ongoing	Current policy does not adequately address monitoring requirements.
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Testing the backup and recovery capabilities of the Computerized Criminal History System and AFIS [Automated Fingerprint Identification System] to ensure that it can recover those systems.</li> </ul>	Fully Implemented as of January 6, 2015	Incomplete/Ongoing	DPS reported that it had not performed a full recovery test as of December 2015. DPS also did not have a documented process to recover data from its remote location.
<b>Texas Department of Criminal Justice</b>				
13	<p>TDCJ should encourage local probation offices to collect state identification numbers and arrest incident numbers for all offenders, and to submit those numbers to ISYS [Intermediate System] in a timely manner. If it identifies local probation offices that do not consistently submit either of these numbers, TDCJ should consider reducing the funds it provides to those offices under Texas Government Code, Section 509.012.</p>	Fully Implemented as of December 17, 2012	Substantially Implemented	While the number of complete records in the Intermediate System has improved, TDCJ policy needs to clearly define compliance expectations and penalties to ensure that all records include the required information.
14	<p>TDCJ should, for offenders who are no longer under probation, develop a process through which local probation departments can submit missing state identification numbers.</p>	Fully Implemented as of December 17, 2012	Incomplete/Ongoing	TDCJ has a process for local probation departments to report missing state identification numbers; however, its policy's primary focus is on offenders who are currently on probation, not offenders who are no longer on probation, as recommended.

Status of Implementation of Prior Audit Recommendations from  
*An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System at the Department of Public Safety and  
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice*

No.	Recommendation	Implementation Status as Reported by the Agency	Implementation Status as Determined by Auditors	Auditor Comments
15	TDCJ should monitor CSCDs [local probation departments] to ensure that they view arrest records associated with flash notices in a timely manner.	Fully Implemented as of December 17, 2012	Incomplete/ Ongoing	While TDCJ implemented a process to monitor local probation departments' viewing of flash notices, that process is not sufficient because its policy does not define expectations for the local probation departments.
16	TDCJ should develop and implement a process to periodically monitor the number of erroneous records that local probation departments have corrected in ISYS and the number of erroneous records they have not yet corrected.	Fully Implemented as of December 17, 2012	Fully Implemented	
17	TDCJ should segregate the duties of making and deploying all changes to the Corrections Tracking System, operating systems, and databases to help ensure compliance with Title 1, Texas Administrative Code, Section 202.25 (6)(C).	Fully Implemented as of December 19, 2012	Substantially Implemented	While TDCJ has limited programmers' access to the Corrections Tracking System since 2011, four programmers still have administrative access to the Intermediate System.
18	TDCJ should establish policies and procedures that differentiate between changes that it is responsible for making to its automated systems and changes that contractors are responsible for making to help ensure compliance with Title 1, Texas Administrative Code, Section 202.20 (5).	Fully Implemented as of December 19, 2012	Not Implemented	As of March 2016, TDCJ had not updated its 2010 policies and procedures.
19	TDCJ should configure its mainframe security software to secure all critical components of the Corrections Tracking System and database.	Fully Implemented as of December 19, 2012	Fully Implemented	
20	TDCJ should use a risk-based process to activate and monitor audit trails for all changes to criminal records in the Corrections Tracking System to help ensure compliance with Title 1, Texas Administrative Code, Section 202.25 (5)(B).	Fully Implemented as of December 19, 2012	Incomplete/ Ongoing	While TDCJ has activated certain audit trails to protect its data, it has not designated a position to monitor those audit trails on a regular basis.



# Appendices

## Appendix 1

### *Objective, Scope, and Methodology*

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#### Objective

The objective of this audit was to determine whether controls over the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) help ensure that data in the system is complete, accurate, and up to date.

#### Scope

The scope of this audit covered data from CJIS. Specifically, data from the Department of Public Safety's (DPS) Computerized Criminal History System from September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015. The scope also covered data from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) Corrections Tracking System for offenders placed in prison, in jail, and on parole during February 2015 and data from its Intermediate System<sup>14</sup> for offenders placed on probation from September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015.

#### Methodology

The audit methodology included reviewing the processes for collecting criminal information at DPS and TDCJ; analyzing performance reports that DPS uses to determine completeness of criminal records; analyzing error reports and correction logs; analyzing key data elements for various offender populations to determine data completeness; reviewing the flash notice process applicable to offenders on probation; assessing general and application controls and relevant subsystems for CJIS; and visiting criminal justice agencies that submit data to CJIS.

#### Data Reliability

Auditors assessed the reliability of data in the systems that comprise CJIS, which includes the Computerized Criminal History System at DPS and the Corrections Tracking System at TDCJ. To assess the reliability of those systems, auditors reviewed controls in place, including access and change management controls; conducted interviews with people knowledgeable about the data and systems; visited six criminal justice entities responsible for reporting criminal information to CJIS; tested the accuracy of 22

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<sup>14</sup> As part of its Corrections Tracking System, TDCJ uses a component called the Intermediate System to track information on offenders serving probation. The Intermediate System allows local probation departments to upload probation records that do not have an offender state identification number and/or an incident number.

Computerized Criminal History System data elements and 8 TDCJ Corrections Tracking System data elements for parole records; and performed analysis of key information fields for probation, prison, and jail records in the Corrections Tracking System.

While auditors determined that DPS Computerized Criminal History System information may not be complete for various reasons, such as arrest dispositions taking longer than a year to go through the legal system, DPS has adequate controls in place to ensure that the information for 22 key data elements reviewed is sufficiently reliable. However, the information for 8 key data elements reviewed for TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System was not sufficiently complete and accurate. (See Chapters 1-B and 2-B for details and recommendations related to data completeness and accuracy.)

#### Sampling Methodology

To test the accuracy of the data in DPS's Computerized Criminal History System, auditors selected a nonstatistical, random sample of arrest records, prosecutor dispositions, and court dispositions that criminal justices entities in Bell County and Hidalgo County reported in fiscal year 2015.

To test the accuracy of the data in TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System, auditors selected a nonstatistical, random sample of records for offenders placed on parole during February 2015. Auditors used the same sample to test selected data elements applicable to offenders placed in prison. Auditors also used professional judgment to select a sample of records for offenders placed in prison, in jail, and on probation during February 2015 to test the accuracy of data in selected information fields.

The samples items tested generally were not representative of the population and, therefore, it would not be appropriate to extrapolate those results to the population.

Information collected and reviewed included the following:

DPS:

- *Annual Report Examining Compliance to the Texas Computerized Criminal History System* for calendar years 2009 through 2013.
- *The Statewide Combined Completeness Percentage* report as of January 2015 for calendar years 2009 through 2013.
- Arrest and disposition records submitted to the Computerized Criminal History System from September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015.

- Bell County and Hidalgo County arrest and disposition records.
- Prosecutor and courts error frequency distribution reports.
- *General Manual* information technology policies.
- Change management documentation.
- Backup and recovery documentation.
- Access lists for DPS, prosecutor offices, and court users who could update data in the Computerized Criminal History System.

TDCJ:

- Corrections Tracking System records for offenders admitted to jail and prison and placed on parole during February 2015.
- Intermediate System records for offenders placed on probation from September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015.
- Flash notice activity reports for March 2015 through October 2015.
- TDCJ's policy statement on flash notices and error rates.
- Transaction and error logs from the Intermediate System.
- *Information Resources Security Program* manual.
- Change management documentation.
- Access lists for users who could update the Corrections Tracking System and the Intermediate System.

Procedures and tests conducted included the following:

- Analyzed the criminal justice processes related to CJIS data.
- Reviewed DPS processes to generate the *Report Examining Compliance to the Texas Computerized Criminal History System*.
- Reviewed DPS calculations to determine the percent of arrest records that prosecutor offices or courts disposed of for calendar years 2009 through 2013.
- Calculated the average time that criminal justice agencies took to submit records to DPS's Computerized Criminal History System.

- Visited a total of six law enforcement entities (two police departments, two prosecutor's offices, and two court offices) in Bell County and Hidalgo County and tested the accuracy of criminal records submitted by each of those entities to CJIS.
- Reviewed *Prosecutor and Courts Error Frequency Distribution Reports*.
- Reviewed access configurations for DPS's Computerized Criminal History System and related Web portals.
- Reviewed DPS information technology policies and procedures.
- Tested DPS's processes for modifying data in the Computerized Criminal History System.
- Reviewed DPS's backup and recovery process for the Computerized Criminal History System.
- Attended training for TDCJ's Intermediate System.
- Analyzed the completeness of records for the following populations:
  - ♦ Intermediate System records for offenders placed on probation from September 1, 2014, through August 31, 2015.
  - ♦ Corrections Tracking System records for offenders placed in jail or prison or placed on parole during February 2015.
- Tested the accuracy of key data elements for parole and prison records from the Corrections Tracking System.
- Reconciled TDCJ Corrections Tracking Data with DPS arrest and court records in the Computerized Criminal History System.
- Analyzed the *Flash Notice Activity Report* and reviewed TDCJ corresponding policies and procedures.
- Analyzed the transaction and error logs from the Intermediate System.
- Reviewed access configurations for TDCJ's Corrections Tracking System and databases.
- Reviewed access configurations that support TDCJ's Intermediate System database, servers, virtual private networks, and file transfer protocol server.

- Tested TDCJ's processes for modifying data in the Corrections Tracking System.
- Reviewed TDCJ's *Information Resources Security Program* manual.

Criteria used included the following:

- Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 60.
- Title 1, Texas Administrative Code, Chapter 202.
- Department of Information Resources *Security Control Standards Catalog*, version 1.2.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice Information Services Security Policy, version 5.3.

#### Project Information

Audit fieldwork was conducted from July 2015 through December 2015. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The following members of the State Auditor's staff performed the audit:

- Ileana Barboza, MBA, CGAP (Project Manager)
- Eric Ladejo, MPA (Assistant Project Manager)
- Paige Dahl
- Joseph A. Kozak, CPA, CISA
- Fred Ramirez
- Varinder Singh
- Quang Tran
- J. Scott Killingsworth, CIA, CGAP, CGFM (Quality Control Reviewer)
- Cesar Saldivar, CGAP, CICA (Audit Manager)

## Issue Rating Classifications and Descriptions

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Auditors used professional judgement and rated the audit findings identified in this report. Those issue ratings are summarized in the report chapters/sub-chapters. The issue ratings were determined based on the degree of risk or effect of the findings in relation to the audit objective(s).

In determining the ratings of audit findings, auditors considered factors such as financial impact; potential failure to meet program/function objectives; violation of state statute(s), rules, regulations, and other requirements or criteria; and the inadequacy of the design and/or operating effectiveness of internal controls. In addition, evidence of potential fraud, waste, or abuse; significant control environment issues; and little to no corrective action for issues previously identified could increase the ratings for audit findings. Auditors also identified and considered other factors when appropriate.

Table 3 provides a description of the issue ratings presented in this report.

Table 3

Summary of Issue Ratings	
Issue Rating	Description of Rating
Low	The audit identified strengths that support the audited entity's ability to administer the program(s)/functions(s) audited <u>or</u> the issues identified do not present significant risks or effects that would negatively affect the audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited.
Medium	Issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could <u>moderately affect</u> the audited entity's ability to effectively administer program(s)/function(s) audited. Action is needed to address the noted concern(s) and reduce risks to a more desirable level.
High	Issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could <u>substantially affect</u> the audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited. Prompt action is essential to address the noted concern(s) and reduce risks to the audited entity.
Priority	Issues identified present risks or effects that if not addressed could <u>critically affect</u> the audited entity's ability to effectively administer the program(s)/function(s) audited. Immediate action is required to address the noted concern(s) and reduce risks to the audited entity.

## Overview of the Criminal Justice Information System

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The Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) consist of two independent systems managed by two separate state agencies. The Department of Public Safety (DPS) manages the Computerized Criminal History System, which is the system used to provide criminal background check services. In fiscal year 2015, approximately 4,250 law enforcement agencies, prosecutor’s offices, and court entities reported information to the Computerized Criminal History System.

The Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) manages the Corrections Tracking System, which it uses to manage information on offenders who are currently sentenced to prison, jail, parole, and probation. That system includes the following components:


- The Intermediate System – This system was implemented in January 2005 to allow local probation departments<sup>15</sup> to upload probation records that do not include a state identification number and/or an incident number and, therefore, cannot be uploaded to the Community Supervision Tracking System. Local probation departments create probation records from documentation provided by the courts.
- The State Jail System – This system includes records for offenders sentenced to jail. Those records are created based on documentation provided by the court.
- The State Ready System – This system includes records for offenders sentenced to prison. Those records are created based on documentation provided by the court.
- The Offender Information Management System – This system includes records for offenders who are placed on parole. Those records are created from information in the State Ready System and information from the certificate of parole issued by TDCJ’s Pardons and Parole Division.

In addition, TDCJ and DPS use CJIS to issue “flash notices,” which inform local probation departments about offenders on parole or probation who have a subsequent arrest. Figure 1 on the next page shows the primary components of CJIS and the type of information provided by the various law enforcement agencies.

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<sup>15</sup> Local probation departments are also known as community supervision and corrections departments.

Figure 1



Source: Auditors created Figure 1 based on interviews conducted with DPS and TDCJ staff.



## Counties That Submitted Arrest Records and Corresponding Dispositions in Calendar Year 2013

The Department of Public Safety (DPS) produces a report that details, by county, the number and percent of matching arrests and dispositions within a calendar year. Law enforcement agencies can use those reports to review their performance and correct any errors. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.06, requires law enforcement agencies to submit all criminal records to DPS. Table 4 lists the number of arrests each county reported from January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2013, and the number of prosecutor and court records associated with each arrest that had been submitted to DPS as of January 2015.

Table 4

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015			
County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
Anderson County	2,104	1,323	62.88%
Andrews County	1,122	873	77.81%
Angelina County	3,005	2,270	75.54%
Aransas County	634	411	64.83%
Archer County	378	252	66.67%
Armstrong County	56	36	64.29%
Atascosa County	1,607	793	49.35%
Austin County	892	754	84.53%
Bailey County	241	209	86.72%
Bandera County	606	500	82.51%
Bastrop County	2,252	1,670	74.16%
Baylor County	110	91	82.73%
Bee County	1,124	520	46.26%
Bell County	10,609	8,623	81.28%
Bexar County	43,563	34,534	79.27%
Blanco County	364	187	51.37%
Borden County	9	2	22.22%
Bosque County	512	403	78.71%
Bowie County	3,096	2,468	79.72%
Brazoria County	10,250	9,557	93.24%
Brazos County	7,204	5,520	76.62%
Brewster County	381	293	76.90%

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015

County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
Briscoe County	21	14	66.67%
Brooks County	487	383	78.64%
Brown County	1,794	1,190	66.33%
Burleson County	754	519	68.83%
Burnet County	1,955	1,446	73.96%
Caldwell County	1,800	1,323	73.50%
Calhoun County	923	696	75.41%
Callahan County	322	237	73.60%
Cameron County	11,515	7,448	64.68%
Camp County	502	412	82.07%
Carson County	596	405	67.95%
Cass County	770	537	69.74%
Castro County	230	136	59.13%
Chambers County	1,485	1,126	75.82%
Cherokee County	1,836	1,017	55.39%
Childress County	539	421	78.11%
Clay County	375	314	83.73%
Cochran County	79	42	53.16%
Coke County	52	14	26.92%
Coleman County	246	179	72.76%
Collin County	12,003	10,130	84.40%
Collingsworth County	145	101	69.66%
Colorado County	749	670	89.45%
Comal County	3,046	1,592	52.27%
Comanche County	541	384	70.98%
Concho County	91	54	59.34%
Cooke County	1,584	1,263	79.73%
Coryell County	1,951	1,309	67.09%
Cottle County	38	21	55.26%
Crane County	119	99	83.19%
Crockett County	210	138	65.71%
Crosby County	165	110	66.67%
Culberson County	86	24	27.91%
Dallam County	356	128	35.96%
Dallas County	61,450	47,114	76.67%
Dawson County	355	269	75.77%

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015

County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
Deaf Smith County	838	794	94.75%
Delta County	205	147	71.71%
Denton County	12,691	9,878	77.83%
Dewitt County	857	699	81.56%
Dickens County	51	39	76.47%
Dimmit County	508	322	63.39%
Donley County	104	73	70.19%
Duval County	643	280	43.55%
Eastland County	801	696	86.89%
Ector County	6,232	5,129	82.30%
Edwards County	68	47	69.12%
El Paso County	20,637	15,044	72.90%
Ellis County	3,374	2,879	85.33%
Erath County	1,128	980	86.88%
Falls County	555	400	72.07%
Fannin County	919	849	92.38%
Fayette County	580	433	74.66%
Fisher County	105	87	82.86%
Floyd County	70	66	94.29%
Foard County	27	14	51.85%
Fort Bend County	9,728	7,660	78.74%
Franklin County	308	230	74.68%
Freestone County	512	392	76.56%
Frio County	981	840	85.63%
Gaines County	487	361	74.13%
Galveston County	12,595	11,617	92.24%
Garza County	212	134	63.21%
Gillespie County	841	356	42.33%
Glasscock County	52	37	71.15%
Goliad County	194	152	78.35%
Gonzales County	971	757	77.96%
Gray County	998	754	75.55%
Grayson County	5,007	4,622	92.31%
Gregg County	5,714	5,105	89.34%
Grimes County	1,041	401	38.52%
Guadalupe County	2,856	2,495	87.36%

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015

County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
Hale County	1,202	1,021	84.94%
Hall County	125	89	71.20%
Hamilton County	211	104	49.29%
Hansford County	101	78	77.23%
Hardeman County	166	142	85.54%
Hardin County	1,931	1,470	76.13%
Harris County	88,748	85,268	96.08%
Harrison County	2,006	1,595	79.51%
Hartley County	195	151	77.44%
Haskell County	210	144	68.57%
Hays County	5,544	4,239	76.46%
Hemphill County	139	107	76.98%
Henderson County	2,962	2,471	83.42%
Hidalgo County	19,628	15,487	78.90%
Hill County	1,372	1,115	81.27%
Hockley County	1,221	762	62.41%
Hood County	1,681	1,484	88.28%
Hopkins County	1,581	1,375	86.97%
Houston County	710	579	81.55%
Howard County	1,402	1,197	85.38%
Hudspeth County	365	106	29.04%
Hunt County	2,908	2,359	81.12%
Hutchinson County	904	756	83.63%
Irion County	20	18	90.00%
Jack County	231	152	65.80%
Jackson County	703	564	80.23%
Jasper County	1,253	892	71.19%
Jeff Davis County	35	21	60.00%
Jefferson County	8,746	6,462	73.89%
Jim Hogg County	294	164	55.78%
Jim Wells County	1,929	1,382	71.64%
Johnson County	4,150	3,669	88.41%
Jones County	485	384	79.18%
Karnes County	607	329	54.20%
Kaufman County	3,271	2,659	81.29%
Kendall County	837	645	77.06%

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015

County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
Kenedy County	96	58	60.42%
Kent County	13	9	69.23%
Kerr County	2,252	1,922	85.35%
Kimble County	231	120	51.95%
King County	9	1	11.11%
Kinney County	109	92	84.40%
Kleberg County	1,623	1,306	80.47%
Knox County	90	56	62.22%
La Salle County	273	105	38.46%
Lamar County	2,138	1,968	92.05%
Lamb County	454	396	87.22%
Lampasas County	681	604	88.69%
Lavaca County	393	361	91.86%
Lee County	654	588	89.91%
Leon County	441	346	78.46%
Liberty County	2,251	1,643	72.99%
Limestone County	923	749	81.15%
Lipscomb County	28	22	78.57%
Live Oak County	554	422	76.17%
Llano County	839	686	81.76%
Loving County	4	3	75.00%
Lubbock County	11,918	9,495	79.67%
Lynn County	130	55	42.31%
Madison County	691	472	68.31%
Marion County	539	411	76.25%
Martin County	196	77	39.29%
Mason County	49	45	91.84%
Matagorda County	1,569	1,347	85.85%
Maverick County	1,424	317	22.26%
McCulloch County	407	282	69.29%
McLennan County	10,731	8,390	78.18%
McMullen County	107	24	22.43%
Medina County	1,077	746	69.27%
Menard County	132	117	88.64%
Midland County	6,101	4,482	73.46%
Milam County	917	818	89.20%

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015

County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
Mills County	271	207	76.38%
Mitchell County	435	288	66.21%
Montague County	911	588	64.54%
Montgomery County	14,442	13,295	92.06%
Moore County	872	760	87.16%
Morris County	543	379	69.80%
Motley County	15	12	80.00%
Nacogdoches County	3,650	2,974	81.48%
Navarro County	1,992	1,770	88.86%
Newton County	348	235	67.53%
Nolan County	767	601	78.36%
Nueces County	13,858	10,658	76.91%
Ochiltree County	554	359	64.80%
Oldham County	109	79	72.48%
Orange County	2,183	1,814	83.10%
Palo Pinto County	1,036	934	90.15%
Panola County	982	719	73.22%
Parker County	3,302	2,538	76.86%
Parmer County	204	180	88.24%
Pecos County	658	389	59.12%
Polk County	1,828	1,223	66.90%
Potter County	6,426	5,867	91.30%
Presidio County	138	77	55.80%
Rains County	350	301	86.00%
Randall County	2,926	2,770	94.67%
Reagan County	174	101	58.05%
Real County	113	101	89.38%
Red River County	510	451	88.43%
Reeves County	499	406	81.36%
Refugio County	489	281	57.46%
Roberts County	15	14	93.33%
Robertson County	680	628	92.35%
Rockwall County	2,042	1,810	88.64%
Runnels County	314	228	72.61%
Rusk County	1,434	1,241	86.54%
Sabine County	307	248	80.78%

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015			
County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
San Augustine County	502	412	82.07%
San Jacinto County	737	507	68.79%
San Patricio County	3,003	2,272	75.66%
San Saba County	179	91	50.84%
Schleicher County	103	83	80.58%
Scurry County	521	490	94.05%
Shackelford County	122	103	84.43%
Shelby County	1,270	841	66.22%
Sherman County	43	12	27.91%
Smith County	5,303	4,988	94.06%
Somervell County	279	256	91.76%
Starr County	2,401	1,092	45.48%
State and Federal Agencies	1,603	166	10.36%
Stephens County	377	295	78.25%
Sterling County	110	79	71.82%
Stonewall County	41	25	60.98%
Sutton County	146	86	58.90%
Swisher County	100	51	51.00%
Tarrant County	47,627	39,928	83.83%
Taylor County	5,191	4,511	86.90%
Terrell County	31	11	35.48%
Terry County	547	324	59.23%
Throckmorton County	8	1	12.50%
Titus County	1,641	1,266	77.15%
Tom Green County	4,218	3,550	84.16%
Travis County	40,534	30,723	75.80%
Trinity County	471	171	36.31%
Tyler County	630	262	41.59%
Upshur County	1,050	819	78.00%
Upton County	139	73	52.52%
Uvalde County	904	578	63.94%
Val Verde County	1,010	701	69.41%
Van Zandt County	1,266	660	52.13%
Victoria County	3,656	3,025	82.74%
Walker County	2,179	1,729	79.35%
Waller County	1,293	716	55.38%

Adult Arrest Records Submitted to DPS from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, and Corresponding Dispositions Submitted to DPS as of January 2015			
County	Total Arrests Submitted to DPS	Total Dispositions Submitted to DPS	Percent of Arrests for Which Disposition Records Were Submitted to DPS
Ward County	494	430	87.04%
Washington County	1,331	1,067	80.17%
Webb County	11,313	5,052	44.66%
Wharton County	1,934	1,410	72.91%
Wheeler County	311	253	81.35%
Wichita County	5,918	4,964	83.88%
Wilbarger County	446	410	91.93%
Willacy County	694	503	72.48%
Williamson County	11,859	10,141	85.51%
Wilson County	1,285	1,030	80.16%
Winkler County	357	293	82.07%
Wise County	2,051	1,737	84.69%
Wood County	1,116	875	78.41%
Yoakum County	182	155	85.16%
Young County	928	701	75.54%
Zapata County	598	379	63.38%
Zavala County	452	215	47.57%

Source: DPS *Statewide Combined Completeness Percentage Report* as of January 5, 2015.



*Criminal Justice Agencies That Auditors Visited*

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Table 5 lists the six criminal justice agencies that auditors visited in December 2015 while conducting this audit.

Table 5

Criminal Justice Agencies That Auditors Visited	
Agency Name	Agency Type
Killeen Police Department	Law Enforcement Agency
<b>Bell County Attorney's Office</b>	<b>Prosecutor's Office</b>
Bell County Court at Law #2	Court Office
McAllen Police Department	Law Enforcement Agency
<b>Hidalgo District Attorney's Office</b>	<b>Prosecutor's Office</b>
Hidalgo County Court at Law #5	Court Office

## Local Probation Department With the Highest Number of Records That Did Not Have State Identification Numbers

As discussed in Chapter 1-B, local probation offices do not always submit a state identification to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Intermediate System, which is a component of its Corrections Tracking System. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 60.052, states that information in the Corrections Tracking System must include the offender’s state identification number.

Table 6 lists the 10 local probation offices with the highest number of records for offenders placed on probation during fiscal year 2015 that did not have state identification numbers in the Intermediate System.

Table 6

Top Ten Local Probation Departments With the Highest Number of Probation Records That Did Not Have State Identification Numbers in the Intermediate System		
Local Probation Department	Number of Probation Records with No State Identification Number	Percent of Total Probation Records with No State Identification Number
Harris County CSCD <sup>a</sup>	95	9.45%
Bexar County CSCD	87	8.66%
El Paso County CSCD	84	8.36%
Ector County CSCD	52	5.17%
Smith County CSCD	51	5.07%
Cameron County CSCD	41	4.08%
Childress County CSCD	31	3.08%
Pecos County CSCD	26	2.59%
Tarrant County CSCD	23	2.29%
Denton County CSCD	22	2.19%

<sup>a</sup> Local probation departments are also known as community supervision and corrections departments (CSCD).

Source: State Auditor’s Office analysis of records in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Intermediate System.

## Counties That Did Not View Arrest Records Associated with Flash Notices

Auditors reviewed flash notices activity reports associated with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's probation programs in December 2015 and determined that users representing 50 (19.69 percent) of the 254 counties in Texas had not viewed arrest records associated with flash notices from March 18, 2015, through October 19, 2015. Table 7 lists the 46 counties that had an account but did not view flash notices during that time period and the 4 counties that did not have a user access account to view flash notices. It also lists the 6 counties whose user access account was revoked sometime during that time period due to lack of activity or unsuccessful login attempts.

Table 7

Counties That Did Not View Arrest Records Associated with Flash Notices	
County	Account Status
Archer	Inactive
Bailey	Inactive
Bosque	Inactive
Brazos	Inactive
Briscoe	Inactive
Brooks	Inactive
Brown	Revoked
Camp	Revoked
Cherokee	No Account
Clay	Inactive
Collin	Inactive
Colorado	Inactive
Comanche	Inactive
Cooke	Inactive
Dawson	Inactive
Dickens	Inactive
Dimmit	Inactive
Ellis	Inactive
Fannin	Inactive
Fisher	Inactive
Floyd	Inactive
Hamilton	Inactive
Hansford	Revoked
Hardin	Inactive

Counties That Did Not View Arrest Records Associated with Flash Notices	
County	Account Status
Hemphill	Inactive
Hutchinson	Revoked
Jim Wells	Inactive
Johnson	Inactive
Kennedy	Inactive
Kinney	No Account
Kleberg	Inactive
Lamb	Inactive
Lipscomb	Inactive
Maverick	Inactive
Milam	Inactive
Mills	Revoked
Mitchell	Inactive
Montague	Inactive
Montgomery	Inactive
Morris	Inactive
Motley	Inactive
Nolan	Inactive
Ochiltree	Revoked
Parmer	Inactive
Roberts	Inactive
Somervell	Inactive
Stephens	Inactive
Tarrant	Inactive
Terrell	No Account
Titus	Inactive
Val Verde	No Account
Van Zandt	Inactive
Webb	Inactive
Young	Inactive
Zapata	Inactive
Zavala	Inactive

Source: State Auditor's Office analysis of TDCJ's *Flash Notice Activity* report for March 18, 2015, through October 19, 2015.

## **Related State Auditor's Office Work**

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Related State Auditor's Office Work		
Number	Product Name	Release Date
06-022	An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System	February 2006
12-002	An Audit Report on the Criminal Justice Information System at the Department of Public Safety and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice	September 2011

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